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Abstract 
The ideological debate on public government involvement in environmental issue is ever-topical as resource exploitation affects 
the quality of the natural environment. Considering the two issues involved in the analysis of externalities, social welfare and 
property rights, we intend in this paper to develop on the problems related to the implications of the two doctrinal approaches in 
limiting negative externalities, with a special focus on the recent events in the Romanian economy. The most important 
conclusion of this study is the necessity of increasing the moral responsibility of all stakeholders and of strengthening the rule of 
law. As Peter Lewin in his paper, Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability, concluded, “if we can avoid making a 
virtue out of the need to compromise, we may succeed in the future in reducing the need to compromise”. 
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1. Introduction 
The social-cost approach of externalities has strongly developed during the last fifty years within the mainstream, 
as a part of welfare economics. Thus, in the name of social welfare, of equilibrium and efficiency, economists have 
tried to explain how one can determine the optimum level of production from a social point of view, balancing the 
costs and the benefits, respectively the optimal level of pollution and the right to pollute. Although this is a 
convenient approach from the perspective of normative economics and economic policy, it cannot clearly provide 
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answers to the issues related to establishing the taxes or the regulatory instruments due to the impossibility of clearly 
determining the social cost and welfare. 
The alternative approach comes from New institutional and Austrian economics which, rejecting the marginal 
calculation and methodological positivism, considers that social welfare is a conceptual mistake since the 
opportunity cost or happiness are subjective categories and they cannot be determined at a social level. 
Consequently, the entire demonstration on optimal production becomes impossible. Clearly defining and 
strengthening private property rights is the preferred solution for mutual elimination of externalities. 
Considering the two issues involved in the analysis of externalities, social welfare and property rights, we intend 
in this paper to develop on the problems related to the implications of the two doctrinal approaches in limiting 
negative externalities, with a special focus on the recent events in the Romanian economy. 
2. Doctrinal approaches 
2.1. Welfare Economics or a justification for state’s intervention in the problem of externalities  
Drawn from the neoclassical tradition, in line with methodological individualism, welfare economics excels in 
mathematical formalism, in an attempt to determine the optimum and maximum social welfare for the greatest 
number of people. Fascinated with the ideal of maximization and resource efficiency, to which it is bounded, 
normative economics has tried to find a bridge between individual and social values in order to prove that, also at 
the social level, this ideal is attainable. From this point of view, the public decision-maker is acting with the desire 
to predict and efficiently allocate resources, to correct macroeconomic imbalances and transform the whole society 
according to a perfect scheme (Baciu, 2013, 5-55). For example, pollution is regarded as a market failure in the 
attempt to achieve social optimum, State intervention serving in this case to offset the lack in market’s maximizing 
rationality and guide the allocation of resources so that social welfare (here also taking into account the negative 
effects on the environment) be maximized. 
Taking the example of an aggregate that registers negative external effects on the environment, welfare 
economists assume that we can determine the level of pollution that does not endanger health/life and require a 
taxation level that diminishes pollution up to that point. According to the approach proposed by Arthur C. Pigou 
(1932), the solution in internalizing pollution is to impose corrective taxes (Pigou taxes). Their role is to transform 
the marginal private cost into a social cost when the firm cannot internalize voluntarily the external costs of 
pollution (through innovation and technology). If, for society, the value of fresh air is more important than the 
decline in production due to internalized pollution, then, the new position of equilibrium is a Pareto improvement 
and the resource efficiency principle is thus respected. 
 The production decrease raises a number of questions that do not have a convenient answer. Can society support 
the production decrease? Isn’t the price increase a new external negative effect? What are the implications on the 
company’s profit? What about on the income of employees? What are the regulatory alternatives? These problems 
involved in environmental pollution can be analyzed by relying on two concepts: social welfare and property rights 
(Nellis&Parker, 2006, 336-342). 
Social welfare refers to the welfare of the whole society and reflects both internal (private) and external (social) 
costs and benefits derived from the production of goods and services. Therefore, including social welfare is affected 
by environmental issues, as they affect the actual quality of life. Property rights represent the right to receive, use 
and transfer property. Most goods have clear property rights. But there is no owner for goods such as the air or the 
seas and oceans. 
Generally, economists tend to solve the pollution problem by means of market. It is commonly accepted that 
excessive bans and regulations may result in losses of social utility. For example, new, perhaps more efficient, less 
polluting businesses cannot enter the market if the production line is restricted or strictly controlled by the state. 
Therefore, tradable pollution permits have become more and more popular with economists.  
They are a way to internalize external costs, because if the polluting company can produce low-cost, then it can 
afford to buy more permits and can consequently produce a greater amount as compared to a firm that produces with 
high costs and, in order to buy new permits, it should significantly reduce their profits. Alternatively, the 
government may allow citizens in the affected area to negotiate with the polluting company. When transaction costs 
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are low or zero there will be mutual understanding between the parties, where contracts and property rights are 
clearly specified. On the other hand, if there are more victims of pollution, the transaction increase costs and 
negotiations can be greatly hampered, especially if they engage in a strategic behavior, or when the effects of 
pollution threaten the resources of several generations, mutually beneficial solutions are more difficult to identify. 
Thus, a number of questions can arise, such as: Who has the right to decide on underground resources? Can the 
pollution problem be left solely to local or national authorities? All these are related to property rights. 
2.2. The market  solution  
An important critic regarding the welfarist concept efficiency refers to the fact that the Pareto principle is 
individualistic and cannot be used as a social rule for two reasons. First, it refers to the absolute good in terms of 
maximum utility, for the individual, and does not allow assessments as regards the relative good (from one to the 
other). The concept utility, being defined for an individual in a given context, does not allow the possibility to 
compare satisfaction at different moments in time, in different contexts, etc. Second, what is important is the 
personal assessment of good and satisfaction and not that of a certain authority, no matter how omniscient it may be. 
Neither interpersonal comparisons nor measuring the utility from one individual to another is possible, because 
utility is purely subjective. Thus, the economic calculus can only serve the aspirations of individuals or groups of 
individuals working in the institutional framework of the market economy, as Mises considers. It is, therefore, a 
calculus of private profits and not of "social welfare" and is not used for hypothetical evaluations of a dictatorial 
body, called to manage all the national or global affairs. The one who try to judge actions in terms of a supposed 
"social value", in terms of the „whole society", has nothing to do with economic calculus (Mises, 1966). To accept, 
for example, the decline in production in the name of social welfare means to make value judgments such as: the 
loss of profits for the rich is less important than the health and satisfaction of people living in the polluted area. 
External imposition of a solution in this context appears as an abuse because the people involved are only able to 
assess damages and negotiate a mutually satisfactory solution. 
Thus, unlike the mainstream approach, the Austrian economic school, as well as the institutional one, refuses 
simultaneously the marginal optimizing calculus and the state intervention on behalf of the optimum. Addressing the 
two schools of thought, although different in terms, is united by the faith in the principle of freedom of choice for 
individuals within the free market based on property rights.  
Market solution to externalities is to internalize the costs and calculate the social one. Externalities arise because 
those who benefit from, or those that harm, do not pay the full consequences of their actions. Externalities can be 
removed if the property right is defined correctly. The property right ensures an individual the exclusive use of the 
right of usufruct. This hypothesis, according to which when there are externalities, owners find common institutional 
solutions to internalize costs and their elimination on mutual way, is owed to Ronald Coase (1960), being known as 
the Coase Theorem. The solution to pollution limitation is the assignment of liability or a wider coverage of 
property rights, so that even the environment could have legally identifiable owners.  
For example, the plant that pollutes the air/water could be nearby an orchard, or other agricultural activities. The 
plant could be given the right to pollute as much as the farm owner could be granted the right not to be polluted. 
Without the intervention of any outside authority, if the two actors sat at a negotiating table, the plant could pay the 
farmer a compensation up to the limit of its production efficiency, or the farmer may pay compensation so that the 
plant could reduce its production to an acceptable limit. These negotiations will be done in terms of marginal 
opportunity cost for the actors, in terms of alternative sacrifices for each of them (for the farmer, the paid 
compensation should be equal to the production of fruit compromised due to an increase with one unit of pollution). 
Any change in the marginal opportunity cost for the two can lead to renegotiation. Only individuals can weigh the 
value of different sacrificed alternatives, the well-being being subjective, thus the state intervention is not justified. 
Market forces will determine the agents involved to achieve equality between private and social marginal costs and, 
in the absence of corrective taxes, to reach a compromise which, even though not a Pareto improvement, is mutually 
beneficial. 
Coase’s “theory” functions under the circumstances where there is the possibility of a negotiation. In other 
words, it functions when there is a market on which costs connected to information, monitoring, negotiation and 
56   Livia Baciu and Andreea – Oana Iacobuţă /  Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  53 – 58 
application of the agreement or of the contract can be noticed and quantified. It is possible, however, that the place 
and role of the market be taken over by the State (PohoaĠă&Iacobu܊ă, 2008, 367). 
If Coase’s theorem is correct, firms internalize external non-economies and calculate the social cost, and the 
individuals give themselves compensations in exchange for the negative externalities. But why would state 
intervention be necessary if the market adjusts itself to these problems? Interventionist economists argue that 
difficulties will arise in terms of negotiation and information or transaction costs that will jeopardize or delay 
voluntary agreements. This could be the case of a major spill where human victims can appear or the case of 
underground, where the problem arises from the access to resources for future generations, namely their lack of 
representativeness in the decision-making process regarding environmental issues. Therefore, among economists, 
there are disagreements about the need for state intervention through regulation in many of these situations imposing 
behavioral norms and sanctions. This public service is also an externality in itself. A new law (a new pollution 
standard) will be favorable to some, who wanted for example pollution reduction, but will disadvantage others who 
will see their profits diminished. 
The state is nothing but a vehicle for reducing transaction costs that may arise between individuals who otherwise 
fail to reach a compromise. It provides the institutional framework within which economic actors pursue their well-
being. This is not an unimportant function and at the same time should not be considered free. It involves the 
creation of institutions, their functioning by allocating public resources for their purposes, other transactional costs 
when public decisions are made through social compromise, the emergence of bureaucratic pressures the appearance 
of a state captive to lobby groups etc.“...The governmental administrative machine is not itself costless. It can, in 
fact, be extremely costly on occasions” (Coase, 1960, 9) 
Economic goods have a clear property right: take for example a retail store, whose owner can always sell it, 
develop it, use it as he sees fit. In contrast, other goods, such as the air or the seas, do not have a clear ownership 
status, which is known as The tragedy of the commons. On a pond where fishing is not restricted, fishermen will 
have direct and unlimited access. However, the extent to which each of them can fish depends on the total number of 
fishermen, as the lake is more crowded so each of them will have negative effects due to the others’ decision to fish. 
For sea fishing with fishing boats, the more boats are offshore, the lower the quantity of fish per boat.  
If we calculated the marginal private benefit, it would be higher and the social one would be lower, as benefit per 
boat diminishes as the number of boats grows and decreases the total amount of fish produced. Each boat, in order to 
get the same amount of fish as before, must go further and further from shore, in hazardous locations, that is why the 
marginal social benefit decreases as compared to that of the private sector. 
If the fishing area should be owned by an association of fishermen, it could preserve fish stocks by restricting the 
number of boats, the conservation of fish species and multiplying them rationally. This measure will lead to a 
smaller quantity of fish per boat and diminish the private benefit, but will eliminate overfishing and contribute to the 
long-term preservation of fishery resources. Rothbard argued that there is technically no problem to imagine that the 
so-called public goods could not be held also privately. For example, highways, pastures, even water can be 
obtained privately through lots (Rothbard, 1982, 55-99). In the case of air, when damage is evident that principles of 
causation beyond a Reasonable Doubt, injured parties may form a group and can sue the polluter through a class 
action suit. Talking about air, when damage is evident and that principles of causation beyond a reasonable doubt 
are complied with, the injured parties may form a group and can sue the polluter through a class action suit  
Although in principle it is easy to imagine that private property rights can be attributed to commons, in reality 
issues related to the nature of the properties of the right of usufruct still remain unresolved. For example, if the 
exploitation of shale gas by hydraulic fractionation, if the surface property is resolved by lots, the environmental 
damage can be brought to court by the injured, how can we resolve the situation for future generations who remain 
without water and whose welfare decreases as an important resource will be available at a much higher cost? 
3. Recent cases in Romania 
Resource depletion in hydrocarbons, the lack of concrete perspectives to replace hydrocarbons at the level of 
global demand in energy, the increase of energy prices, etc. led to the exploitation of unconventional gases, shale 
gas included. In the case of Romania, a significant part of the territory has been leased by the state to a foreign 
capital company for the exploitation of shale gas by means of hydraulic fractioning. The benefits for Romania 
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include the increase in gas offer, lower prices on the domestic market, and the increase of the country’s autonomy 
towards imports. Lower prices for gas create social benefits by their immediate effects on industrial and domestic 
consumers and mediated effects by the diminution of other prices; the gas surplus in certain periods of the year 
could afford gas exports rises which might bring important financial resources to the Romanian budget as tax, 
royalties and excises.        
At the same time, financial benefits and surpluses resulting from price differences need to be diminished by a 
series of losses associated to environmental damages as follows (www.stofracturare.ro): 1) The method requires the use 
of a huge amount of water. The Chevron perimeter in the area of Bârlad/Vaslui county requires an amount of water 
equal to the consumption of Bârlad for the next 300 years (which is very much for an area as scarce in resources as 
this one) to fracture the entire perimeter at full capacity. 2) The water used by fracturing contains a series of 
chemical additives whose impact on the environment remains unknown. A fracturing requires approximately 150 
tons of chemical additives (including carcinogenic ones). 3) The resulting wells may crack which means that the 
respective additives do not remain at the initial depth, but migrate with water through rock cracks gradually 
penetrating the groundwater. 4) A part of the resulting shale gases are eliminated in the atmosphere which also leads 
to air pollution. All these can affect life quality to a great extent and irremediably damage rivers, lakes, forests and 
agricultural lands. 
The same genre of cost-benefit analysis/ risks of contamination and damage of the ecosystem may also be caused 
at Rosia Montana by Rosia Montana Gold Corporation, a company with American capital. Rosia Montana is 
Romania’s most controversial project due to the suspicions of corruption on how the first licenses were awarded and 
the risks the area is consciously subjected to. It is the oldest recorded establishment in the country (with valuable 
archaeological sites) which lies on the greatest amount of gold in Europe. It is said that the Dacians took more than 
1000 tons of gold to Rome. The benefits are obvious. But on the other hand, there are many risks in the exploitation 
procedure. The greatest danger lies in the tailings management facility with cyanides that will be created in the area 
whose dam may break. Moreover, it will wipe out several national heritage elements from the face of the earth. 
Starting from these aspects, a major part of the Romanian public opinion protested against such exploitations of 
resources as foreign capital companies exploit resources, make a profit and then abandon the location without taking 
responsibility for environmental issues. Being a poor country, Romania will not have the necessary resources to 
remedy the situation, leaving the inhabitants to deal with the occurred problems. Thus, it is possible that the benefits 
obtained on the short term might not compensate the costs incurred on the long term. Similar situations of 
environmental abuse occurred where polluting enterprises obtained the right of exploitation for resources not by 
acquiring property rights, but on lease (Salin, 2013, 329). The result is profit maximization for the respective 
companies and resource exploitation without preservation/ regeneration. In this way, the right on usufruct is 
obtained without the obligations resulting from property.      
Such a lease creates stimulation for destruction and not creativity (Salin, 2013, 330). The winners are leasing 
companies and the state that cashes royalties for a while. In its turn, corruption facilitates things as licenses or 
permits are granted based on forged environmental reports. The ones suffering the damage are the first occupants, 
the inhabitants of the area for several generations who witnessed resource depletion and environmental degradation. 
Conversely, if the exploiting company is the owner of resources, it is motivated to continuously improve 
technologies and behave as an inventive entrepreneur interested in community integration and contribution to 
general wealth. Thus, they run the risk of compromising their own business and lower their profits by paying 
damages. 
4. Conclusions  
Within the free market system individuals who are also owners can appreciate, according to their own interest; 
whatever has value to them. A natural resource is not wealth unless it is employed to meet the needs of people, and 
the free price system as well as private property are those institutions that allow people to make choices being fully 
aware of the opportunity costs. Accepting the need for compromise we responsibly assume as few compromises as 
possible.  
Many renowned economists have expressed their confidence in innovation and technical progress in order to 
facilitate the progressive removal of the negative effects of economic growth on the environment (Solow, Nordhaus, 
58   Livia Baciu and Andreea – Oana Iacobuţă /  Procedia Economics and Finance  20 ( 2015 )  53 – 58 
Stiglitz, Arrow etc). In time, much of the environmental damage occurred accidentally because of incomplete or 
insufficient knowledge. 
If entrepreneurs were malicious, many of the innovations of today's world, from which we all benefit, would not 
have been produced. In reality, entrepreneurs have an interest in preserving the value of their property. Therefore, 
the solution- to which we adhere- to limit the negative externalities is that of the market is because the regulation or 
taxes do nothing else but to bring additional revenue to the State. For the labor and capital involved in polluting 
industries which are hit by regulatory or corrective tax, all the measures limiting production may seem unfair. If the 
state is corrupted or trapped within influence groups, regulations will favor some while others will be harmed. 
Pollution Victims never receive the required compensation. 
Rather, in the context of the rule of law, a system of clear property rights, the damaged individual may appeal 
against the polluting company, which may have knock-on effects on other firms which will be forced to take 
measures in order to eliminate the problems.  
Thus emerges the idea that only private properties, good moral and increased accountability involved by property 
are the solutions to internalize the costs of pollution. Rather than applying the polluter pays principle, the principle 
of live and let live by taking responsibility for their own actions at all levels of decision would be more ethical and, 
at the same time, more efficient. 
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